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The way that contractors in Ghana establish a bidding price, and include allowances 
for risk in their prices is investigated using unstructured interviews and documentary 
analyses. The contextual nature of tendering practices suggested that there may be 
differences in approach between countries. Therefore one objective was to test 
whether there are systematic differences between the approaches in different places. 
Seven contractors were studied to ascertain how they put together a price, and how 
risk apportionment influences price. Most of them established their bidding price by 
building up prices for labour (14%), plant (9%), materials (45%), overhead (15%) and 
profit (10%).  The main determinants of price seemed to be the actual direct costs; 
level of competition; delivery time of the project; payment regime; and clarity of 
tender documents.  Risk allowances of 5-7.5% were included in the profit margin of 
some bill item prices. This was based mainly on the direct judgement of the quantity 
surveyors who calculated the price, based on their intuition and experience.  No 
formal and analytical risk models were used. Indeed, none of the contractors indicated 
any knowledge of published risk models. The contractors‟ risk allowances seemed to 
be guided by concerns about competition and winning the job rather than the true cost 
of risk. Thus, looking at the three systematic processes of formal risk management, it 
cannot be concluded that contractors in Ghana practice formal risk management, 
although it is clear that they do take account of risk when pricing their work. 
Keywords: contractor, Ghana, interview, pricing, tendering. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is standard textbook knowledge that contractors tend to include a hidden premium 
for risk in their bid prices (see for example, a textbook prepared on behalf of The 
Aqua Group practitioners by Hackett et al., 2007: 35).  A study on the contingency 
allocation practices of 12 small-to-medium US contractors by Smith and Bohn (1999: 
101) explained that such premiums can be thought of as a contractor‟s estimated value 
of the extraordinary risks they will encounter in a project.  Extraordinary risks are 
normally project risks that are not covered by bonds, insurance, or the contract (Tah et 
al., 1993) for which contractors need to self insure using contingency (Smith and 
Bohn, 1999).  Most standard estimating textbooks express contractor contingency as a 
fixed percentage of 5-10% of the contract value.  However, the severe nature of 
competition in the construction market indicates that this figure could be high. Three 
empirical studies have shown that risk premiums form around 0-5% of a contractor's 
bidding price (see Neufville and King, 1991 who investigated the risk and need-for-
work premium practices of 30 US contractors; Shash, 1993 who studied the bidding 
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practices of 30 US contractors; and Smith and Bohn, 1999 who studied contingency 
allocation practices of 12 US contractors). 
Several formal and analytical models for contractor‟s risk analysis at the tender stage 
have proliferated since 1971 (summarised in Laryea and Hughes, 2008). The 
analytical approaches assume that contractors include risk contingencies in their bid 
proposals (see unpublished PhD thesis on the relationship between risk and price in 
tendering by Laryea, 2008a: 60-61).  However, the way that contractors actually 
calculate prices and account for risk when bidding is not clearly articulated in the 
construction management literature (see Laryea and Hughes, 2008).  In specific 
relation to Ghana, the process used by contractors for putting together a bidding price, 
including how risk is taken into account, is yet to be investigated. The contextual 
nature of tendering practices suggests that there may be differences in approach 
between countries. Therefore one objective was to test whether there are systematic 
differences between the approaches in different places. The objectives here are: 
 To ascertain how contractors in Ghana establish a construction price; and 
 To ascertain how they include risk in their bid prices. 
Ghana is a typical developing country
3
 with a growing economy and construction 
sector (as shown in analysis of the causality links between the growth of the 
construction industry in Ghana and the growth of its macro-economy by Anaman and 
Osei-Amponsah, 2007).  In Ghana, the absence of research of such nature meant that a 
vital gap in knowledge about the tendering practices of contractors will be filled. 
HOW CONTRACTORS APPROACH RISK IN THE TENDER 
PROCESS 
The research literature on how contractors approach risk apportionment in the tender 
process is reviewed in Laryea (2008a: 34-63).  Furthermore, the research literature on 
the relationship between risk and price in tendering, mechanisms used by contractors 
for pricing risk, and formal and analytical risk models in construction is summarised 
in Laryea and Hughes (2008). The way that risk pricing is approached in different 
business sectors such as finance, insurance and construction is articulated in Laryea 
(2008b).  Laryea (2008c) describes public sector tendering processes in Ghana based 
on a case study.  Therefore, this section of the paper summarises generally the concept 
of risk in specific relation to contractors and contractor risk management practices. 
Risk in relation to contractors 
Little attention has been focussed on a precise definition and evaluation mechanism 
for project management risk specifically related to contractors.  Project Management 
Institute (2004: 238) define risk as an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, 
has a positive or a negative effect on at least one project objective, such as time, cost, 
scope, or quality.  However, three risk definitions may help to articulate a better 
understand of risk in the context of construction contractors.  First, in developing a 
systematic influence diagram-based model for contractors risk analysis at the tender 
stage, Al-Bahar and Crandall (1990: 534) described risk as "an exposure to the 
chances or occurrences of events adversely or favourably affecting project objectives 
as a consequence of uncertainty."  Second, a practitioners‟ textbook prepared on 
behalf of the Aqua Group by Hackett et al. (2007: 35) defined risk as "the possible 
loss resulting from the difference between what was anticipated and what finally 
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happened."  Third, a financial analysis and management textbook by Fisher and 
Jordan (1996: 70) defined risk as "the possibility that realised returns will be less than 
the returns that were expected".  
Thus, risk may be understood in the context of contractors as a positive or negative 
deviation to expected profit.  This aligns with Chang and Tien‟s (2006: 171) definition 
of risk as "a measure of the probability and consequence of not achieving a goal."  
Risk is not the same as risks, although the terms are often used interchangeably in the 
literature. Whiles risk is the deviation to an expected outcome, risks are the actual 
deviation-causing events.  As explained in a financial analysis textbook by Fisher and 
Jordan (1996: 70), forces [risks] that contribute to variations in return constitute 
elements of risk. Al-Bahar and Crandall (1990) defined risk event as what might 
happen in favour or in detriment of a project.  In examining the way software 
practitioners are taught to perform risk management, Pfleeger (2000: 266) stated three 
criteria for identifying a risk event. First, a loss associated with the event, often called 
the risk impact.  Second, the likelihood that the event will occur, with risk probability 
often measured with a number between zero (impossible) and one (certain).  Third, the 
degree to which the project team can change the outcome, either by mitigating the 
risk‟s causes before they occur or by controlling the risk's effects afterwards.  An 
experiential-based textbook by Park (1979: 170) explained 12 risk events contractors 
face as: weather, unexpected job conditions, personnel problems, errors in cost 
estimating/scheduling, delays, financial difficulties, strikes, faulty materials, faulty 
workmanship, operational problems, inadequate plans or specifications, and disaster. 
Contractor risk management practices 
Risk management is mostly defined as a logical process of risk identification, risk 
analysis and evaluation, and risk monitoring and control (PMI, 2004). 
Contractors have often been portrayed to be poor at managing risk by for example, 
authors such as Baloi and Price (2003: 262), Ahmed et al. (2002: 4) and Kangari and 
Riggs (1989: 126).  In developing an analytical model for modelling global risks, 
Baloi and Price (2003) said: "…many contractors are unfamiliar with these risk 
factors and do not have the experience and knowledge to manage them effectively. As 
a consequence, conflicts, poor quality, late completion, poor cost performance and 
business...Contractors have traditionally used high mark-ups to cover risk but as their 
margins have become smaller this approach is no longer effective...Contractors rarely 
use these techniques and tools in practice. More often than not construction 
contractors and other practitioners rely on assumptions, rules of thumb, experience 
and intuitive judgement which can not be fully described by prescriptive or normative 
models. Individual knowledge and experience, however, need to be accumulated and 
structured to facilitate the analysis and retrieval by others." 
According to Ahmed et al. (2002), "The construction industry has a poor reputation in 
coping with risks, many projects failing to meet deadlines and cost targets."  Kangari 
(1989) said: "…the construction industry has a very poor reputation for coping with 
risk.  Risk analysis is either ignored or done subjectively by simply adding a 
contingency.  As a result many major projects fail to meet schedule deadlines and cost 
targets with attendant loss to both contractors and owners." 
However, these assertions may not be true generally.  Since general contracting started 
in the early parts of the 19th century, contractors have used various means to survive 
risks in construction industry. Most contactors resorted to speculative house building 
in the 19th and 20th centuries to sustain labour force and business costs through the 
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peaks and troughs of contracted work. In modern times, there is a growing tendency 
for contractors to use their positive cash flows to invest in projects, rather than house 
building. Most recently, successful contractors are diversifying into businesses whose 
cycles counteract those of construction   (Oxford Encyclopaedia of Economic History, 
2003:1:511). Contractors are minimising risk by declining work perceived as too 
risky, subcontracting large portions of their work to others, and apportioning risk in 
wage structures. In essence, they are passing on risk to others.  A questionnaire survey 
of 19 contractors in Australia by Bajaj et al. (1997) identified five of the ways used by 
contractors for identifying risk at the tender stage of projects: (1) Risk review (by 
senior staff at the start of the tender pricing); (2) Contact (discussions with 
subcontractors, architect and client); (3) Research (ascertaining information about 
subcontractors, client, consultants, economic climate, etc); (4) Site visit (visiting site 
to ascertain the access situation, location, obstructions, etc); and (5) Finance (issues 
regarding payment and financial obligations). 
CONTRACTOR INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS 
Exploratory interviews and documentary analyses carried out in seven construction 
firms in Ghana are reported.  In-depth interviews with the QSs (estimators) who price 
the actual work and some directors were carried out in 2006 and 2007.  Each interview 
was unstructured and recorded with the interviewee‟s permission. Each one lasted 
roughly 95 minutes. The contractors were all in the Financial Class D1 category i.e. 
those licensed by the Ghanaian Ministry of Works and Housing to build the largest 
projects. D1 contractors are likely to consider prices more carefully because of the 
complex and risky nature of their projects and the professional background of their 
staff; they have well situated offices that can be easily located; and they are assumed 
to practice formal contract administration procedures because of the professional 
background of their staff and the size of their organisation and projects. 
The literature review provided a basic scheme of things to look for, but the main 
purpose of the approach to interviewing (unstructured interviews) was to allow the 
respondents to focus on what they felt was important, so the main headings in the 
content analysis emerged from reading the interviews, and indexing them by the 
issues that were most important to the respondents.  This was interpreted from the way 
that they described their work. The interviews were analysed by indexing the 
contractors‟ statements and collating those common to the particular themes in the 
study for a qualitative interpretation.  
In each firm, documents used by the contractors in the actual price build-up process 
were collected and examined / analysed.  In some of the firms, the respondents 
described their price build-up process and illustrated it with documents from their 
estimating files.  These documents were examined and its content analysed. In other 
firms, the researcher requested and gained access to documents used in the pricing of 
work in order to examine them and obtain a uniform basis of analysis across the firms. 
All the contractors have operated in Ghana for at least 15 years doing all types of 
projects, apart from roads.  Their senior estimators have an average of 21 years‟ 
experience.  Average turnover for 2006 was GH¢4.5m (or ~ USD 4.5m).  An average 
workforce of about 950 people is directly employed in their offices and construction 
sites.  The workforce comprises management, professional and administrative staff, 
artisans and labourers.  The nature of the unstructured interviews used in eliciting 
information from the contractors in Ghana and its analysis is similar to how it was 
applied in the case of UK contractors, as previously described. 
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How contractors in Ghana establish a bidding price 
The profit and loss statement for 2005/2006 for one of the firms was analysed. The 
estimators' matrices for building up unit rates for resources were also analysed.  The 
results of these documentary analyses are reported. 
Bidding price components 
The five elements of a bid price that were mentioned by all the contractors were 
labour, plant and equipment, materials, overheads and profit. However, only one 
contractor mentioned that they also include a contingency for unforeseen works. An 
analysis of the 2005/06 profit and loss statement of one major contractor showed that 
gross profit was 18% of total contract earnings for the year. The ratios of other costs 
showed labour (14%), plant (9%), materials (45%) and overheads (15%). 
Labour price components 
The interviews and documentary analyses showed that the common elements that 
form the basis for building up labour prices are: basic annual salary (27x12), 
workmen‟s compensation (5%), inclement weather (10 days), redundancy (4 weeks), 
social security contribution (12.5%), out-of-station allowance (10 days), sick day with 
pay (2 weeks), medical facilities, funeral grant, transfer allowance (1 month), tools 
allowance, leave / travelling days (23 days), height allowance, safety and health, ex-
gratia (8 weeks), insurance (11/2%) and a margin for profit and overheads (10%). An 
observation of these 17 labour price components shows that four of them are statutory 
provisions. Eight of the items are Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) between 
the Association of Building and Civil Contractors of Ghana (ABCCG) and the 
Construction and Building Materials Workers‟ Union (CBMWU) of TUC. The other 
five are included by the contractor themselves to cover labour-related risks. 
Material price components 
The contractors also have a common way of calculating material prices. The basic 
arithmetic is the addition of cost of the material at ex-stock, transportation cost, waste 
allowances and overhead and profit margin (5-10%). For both normal and specialist 
materials, they often rely on quotations from their suppliers to build up prices. 
Overheads margin components 
A fixed percentage of 15% is often added to the estimated unit cost of resources 
(plant, labour and materials) to cover the cost of overheads. Most of the contractors 
described this as “a charge for the administrative costs of a project”. An analysis of 
the profit and loss accounts of one of the firms gave an idea of the centres of overhead 
costs. Total overhead was 14% of contract earnings for the year 2005. The elements of 
overhead costs comprised vehicle insurance and licensing (0.06% of total overhead 
costs), staff welfare and safety (2.31%), tyres and tubes (4.73%), tender bidding, 
bonds and guarantees (1.33%), vehicles spares and repairs (10.84%), electricity and 
water (2.61%), freight and handling charges (3.34%), rates and licensing (0.15%), fuel 
and lubricants, cube and soil test analysis fees (0.20%), casuals/subcontractors w/tax 
(5.59%), tools and miscellaneous (0.24%), canteen expenses (4.12%), machinery 
spares and repairs and maintenance (4.87%), outstation allowance (6.77%), overseas 
travels (11.18%), hire of transport (1.88%), building maintenance (0.03%) and factory 
inspection fees (0.00%). 
Profit margin components 
Profit margins: All the contractors indicated that the profit margin is allocated in 
conjunction with overheads. The profit is not apportioned as a percentage of the total 
estimated project cost. The margin is added to that for overheads (O&P) and this is 
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apportioned locally on the estimated costs for the items in each work section. The 
views expressed by the contractors can be summarised with what one contractor said: 
“…we apply a fixed percentage on each project for profit and overheads…a smaller 
contractor will apply a smaller percentage for profit and overheads because his 
overheads are less…bigger contractors charge bigger margins for profit and 
overheads. The 15%-35% margin we apply for profit and overheads is also supposed 
to cover our price for unforeseen works. For bigger projects, the profit margin could 
be reduced since variations will most likely occur. However, we are sometimes 
compelled to reduce our profit margins so that we can win a tender. The work is often 
awarded to the lowest price". 
On their profit and contingency allocation practices, one contractor said: “…the size 
of the project influences the percentage we apply for profit…in general, we apply 
higher percentages to smaller projects for profit whereas bigger projects are assigned 
lower percentages for profit…we do this because the same amount of time and human 
resources are required for preparation of different concrete grades…hence, if you are a 
client and you want to save money, it will not be wise for you to use a big contractor 
like us to execute small jobs where you could use a smaller contractor …also, you 
would have to allow for certain things…but you cannot be exact…some will go 
against you, and others will go in your favour…depending on the situation, we usually 
include a fixed percentage between 5-15% for profit and contingencies. A higher 
profit margin is apportioned for smaller projects whereas bigger projects are allocated 
lower percentages for profit since the same amount of time and human resources are 
required to prepare different concrete grades. Hence, it will not be advisable for big 
contractors to execute small jobs whereas clients will be wise not to use big 
contractors for small projects".   
One problem the contractors mentioned was that some other contractors (mostly 
indigenous Ghanaian contractors) would just engage private QSs to price a job for 
them. Then they will bid sometimes without even knowing whether the price would be 
adequate to perform the job or not. Unfortunately, sometimes they get and job. Later, 
some clients came back complaining and asking whether they can go and complete the 
project that was awarded to „quack‟ contractors. 
How contractors in Ghana include risk in their prices 
All the interviewees indicated that they try to include “something” in their estimates 
for “unforeseen works”. On what constitutes unforeseen works, one of the contractors 
said “unforeseen works related mainly to specialist works, since most other aspects of 
a job are quite normal.” One Chief QS said: “…it is difficult to know the right prices 
for specialist bill items without consulting a specialist subcontractor". Apart from 
specialist works, most contractors described the other areas of a project as “quite 
normal” especially if that kind of work has been done in the recent past.” Some of the 
problems faced by the contractors when pricing tenders were expressed by one of the 
respondents as follows: “…the main areas of difficulty have to do with the pricing 
work where there is not enough design detail or specification….for these items or 
areas, we are often not sure exactly what to price because as I told you, there is a lack 
of clarity in either the design or specification of the work to be priced….There is 
initially a discussion of the problem area first to see if someone could point out the 
detail through closer observation / inspection….In certain aspects of the work where a 
lump sum is required, we allow about 5% in the price…we call this a contingency for 
the unforeseen works…we apply this percentage in situations where a bill of 
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quantities is not provided by the client but must be produced by us based on the 
drawings and specifications that they give us…this percentage is also applied in areas 
of the work that we often view as complex, and areas where there are not enough 
design details…reinforcement is often one major item that attracts this allocation". 
Therefore, it is difficult for the contractors to know the right prices for specialist items 
without consulting specialist subcontractors. However, in order to meet a deadline, 
some of them said they would rely on their own experience to arrive at a rough 
approximate estimate and then add about 5-10% of the estimated value. The specialist 
items could also be priced based on a similar job that has been done in the recent past. 
Some of the main specialists‟ works they described are industrial plumbing, steel 
work, galvanised heavy duty PVC piping, structural steel, and electrical work. One 
contractor said “prices for other specialist materials like „alucobond‟ and „marble‟ 
need more time and attention to detail otherwise you would lose money on the job". 
If there is a continuous flow of work, then some of these specialist items would be 
priced more regularly. Some of the contractors indicated that at times when they are 
not sure of what should be done, they decide the prices for some of the specialist items 
through discussions with colleagues. A director in of the firms said "…we may also 
discuss with any of our QSs here in the firm or a QS in another firm, who may 
recently have priced something similar. Then, we base the price of the new works on 
the colleague‟s price and additions for any price changes (exchange rates) and add 
about 10-20% for any changes in price in overseas markets". Sometimes, they also 
search the prices on the internet, and then add the appropriate transportation, shipping 
and import duty tax charges. When they rely on experience, they ask questions such as 
– two years ago, how much did you price it? And what changes have occurred? 
Sometimes not all the materials in a tender document are available locally – again 
„alucobond‟ was cited as a typical example. 
One contractor said: "...prices obtained from suppliers for bidding purposes need to be 
used carefully. You need to tell the suppliers/subcontractors that you need the quotes 
for a tender. Most suppliers tend to place the actual order from overseas at the time 
when an actual order is placed by the contractor, and this could result in significant 
price changes". In pricing contingencies, one contractor said "…we know the 
allowances to price in from experience and the projects we do. If things go adversely 
against us in one or two projects, we could change what we do but for now it is ok". 
DISCUSSION 
Five main points are brought forward for discussion. First, the risk allowances 
included by the contractors were based mainly on a fixed percentage of the estimated 
cost of a bill item. Some also included arbitrary lump sum allowances as they 
calculated quantities and unit rates. One contractor described risks as: "unforeseen 
events that can eat into our profit”. Most contractors said it was difficult to include 
realistic prices for „unforeseen events‟ because of competition. Thus, the amount of 
contingency allocation is guided by concerns about competitors and winning the job 
rather than the level of project risk. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
contractors assume more risk than usual as argued by Smith and Bohn (1999). 
Second, out of the nine main risk pricing mechanisms of contractors reviewed, just 
one is used by contractors in Ghana, i.e. including the risk as a percentage in the profit 
margin.  The 5% risk allowance included in bid prices, in some cases, also appeared to 
be higher than the risk margin of 0% and 3% found of US contractors by Smith and 
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Bohn (1999) and Neufville and King (1991) respectively. Here, the main factors 
affecting pricing levels appeared to be: (1) the actual direct costs; (2) level of 
competition; (3) delivery time of the project; (4) promptness of payment; and (5) 
clarity of tender documents.  The risk assessment practices were based mainly on the 
experience and subjective judgement of the QS and the managing director who were 
believed to make about 95% of the decisions on pricing levels. 
Third, an analysis of the 2006/07 profit and loss statement of one firm showed that 
overhead was 15% of the yearly expenditure.  This seemed to give the arbitrary 15% 
margin that contractors normally apportion for overhead some scientific basis. The 
ratios of other costs showed labour (14%), plant (9%), materials (45%) and overheads 
(15%). This implied that overhead is 15% of the yearly expenditure. This does not 
seem to agree much with Brook (2004: 109) which states the ratios as: labour (23%), 
plant (5%), materials (28%) and subcontractors (44%). Therefore, it implies that not 
much of the main contractor‟s work is subcontracted. The main factors that influenced 
pricing levels appeared to be the actual direct costs; level of competition; delivery 
time of the project; promptness of payment; and clarity of tender documents. 
Fourth, looking at the three systematic risk management processes reviewed, it cannot 
be said that contractors in Ghana practice formal risk management; although it is clear 
that they take account of risks when pricing their work.  No analytical risk models or 
rigorous analysis are applied to determine contingencies. Indeed, none of the 
contractors indicated any knowledge or application of any mathematical approach for 
analysing project risks.  This is similar to findings of a similar interview study of 12 
contractors in the US where Smith and Bohn (1999) found that none of the contractors 
had any knowledge of the mathematical models or techniques proposed for 
formulating contingency allowances in estimates.  Instead, all the contractors relied on 
the QS‟s skill and experience to price risk based on a fixed percentage of the 
estimated costs or an estimated number of days for which risk events are most likely 
to occur during the contract. 
Fifth, the building up of prices for labour and materials showed that some allowances 
were included for risks identified by the contractors.  The contractors assessed factors 
such as the client's ability to pay, project location, the parties involved, and 
contractors' own ability to perform before deciding to bid.  This agrees largely with 
the literature in Smith and Bohn (1999) in relation to factors considered by 12 US 
contractors prior to deciding bid/no-bid. An examination of the project characteristics 
plays a key role in shaping the allocated profit margin.  From the way that they build 
up prices, risk is captured.  Hence, they do not perform any one-off formal risk 
assessment event.  Most of them claimed that most aspects of a project are the normal 
things they do everyday.  Where contractors are not sure, they subjectively include an 
arbitrary allowance of 5-10% to cover any “unforeseen events”. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The study reported shows that the contractors in Ghana clearly consider risk when 
building up prices for a job. The main mechanisms used for taking account of risk in 
the contractors' bid prices are lump sums and a single fixed percentage of the 
estimated cost of a bill item. The risk allowances were mainly based on the experience 
and subjective judgement of the Estimator and the Managing Director who are 
believed to make about 95% of the decisions on pricing levels. Most contractors 
indicated that most aspects of a project are the normal things that they do all the time.  
Just a few aspects of a project normally have bespoke features that create uncertainty.  
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In such cases, if they are uncertain about what amount to price, they simply include an 
arbitrary allowance of between 5-10% in the item price to cover unforeseen events. 
Thus it is clear that the mechanisms used by these contractors in Ghana to price for 
risk when bidding are mainly intuitive and experiential in nature.  Formal risk analysis 
techniques have proliferated in recent years. However, none of the published or 
commercial risk analysis techniques are used.  This indicates that these contractors in 
Ghana do not manage risk in the sophisticated manner reported of their counterparts 
elsewhere in Europe, US, Asia and Australia. The level of the construction industry 
and nature of projects in Ghana may not warrant the use of formal risk management 
techniques in the bid pricing process. Besides, any calculated risks may not be 
included in the final price because of competition. Most contractors said it was 
difficult to charge realistic prices for risk because of competition. Risk premiums are 
shaped by concerns about competition and winning the job rather than the true cost of 
risk. Thus the main determinants of price appeared to be the actual direct costs; level 
of competition; delivery time of the project; promptness of payment; and clarity of 
tender documents. Risk did not seem to have much of an influence on pricing levels. 
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Over the last decade, researchers and practitioners have recognised that the 
relationships between the client and the contractor play a significant role for 
successful project implementation. The interest in joint risk management (JRM) has 
increased as it strengthens collaboration between project actors and contributes to a 
more effective risk management process.  The lack of an iterative and cooperative 
approach to risk management is a weakness in current procurement practice; although 
several empirical studies show that the project actors are positive about 
implementation of JRM. The purpose of this research is to investigate how common 
the use of JRM is in Sweden and if the occurrence is affected by the chosen 
procurement procedures. Empirical data was collected through a questionnaire survey 
of 106 members of the Swedish Construction Clients Forum. The results show limited 
use of JRM in construction projects. Clients that work on a national/international 
level use JRM to a greater extent than those on the local/regional market. The analysis 
also indicates that the use of JRM is positively affected by cooperative procurement 
procedures. In particular, the most significant relationship is found between 
collaborative tools and JRM - the higher the use of collaborative tools, the higher the 
use of JRM. 
Keywords: client, joint risk management, procurement, risk, statistical analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many various risks are involved in construction projects. If risk is not managed it may 
have a negative impact on the project in terms of cost overruns, time delays and 
quality problems. Thus an effective risk management (RM) process is an important 
part of project management that safeguards main project objectives. If risks are to be 
properly managed, it is evident that the RM process must be systematic and based on 
the efficient collaboration between the project actors. However, research in the field of 
construction management indicates that RM is not carried out systematically 
throughout projects (Akintoye and MacLeod 1997, Lyons and Skitmore 2004, 
Osipova 2008, Simu 2006, Tang et al. 2007, Uher and Toakley 1999, Wood and Ellis 
2003). Moreover, adversarial behaviour is common in the construction industry  (Cox 
and Thompson 1997, Zaghloul and Hartman 2003), whilst the use of collaborative 
tools and joint activities (e.g. joint project office, workshops, partnering facilitator) is 
very limited (Eriksson and Laan 2007). 
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For many years, construction projects have been procured through traditional routes 
with lump sum payment mechanisms and standardised conditions of contract. These 
contracts assign responsibilities and liabilities of each party and formalise allocation 
of project risks. However, during the project implementation the identified risks may 
change and new risks may appear. Very often these unplanned changes and 
unforeseen risks may require joint efforts to be managed effectively. The concept of 
joint risk management (JRM) has  been introduced by Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
(2002) and is based on the principles of collaborative relationships between the project 
actors. Despite the fact that JRM is argued to be the best option for managing 
unforeseen risks in projects, the use of this collaborative tool is limited. No studies 
have been conducted in Sweden in order to investigate to what extent JRM is used in 
projects and how different procurement procedures affect JRM. Thus the purpose of 
this research is twofold: 
19. To explore the extent of JRM in construction projects. 
20. To examine procurement procedures' effects on the use of JRM. 
The study is based on the results of a questionnaire survey of Swedish construction 
clients. Through the literature review seven hypotheses about impact of different 
procurement procedures on JRM were formulated. The hypotheses were then 
statistically tested in order to find out what procedures play the most significant role 
for JRM implementation. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Joint risk management 
The most extensive research on JRM has been conducted in Hong Kong by Rahman 
and Kumaraswamy (Kumaraswamy et al. 2004, Rahman 2003, Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 2005, Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008, Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
2002). The main findings of their research are outlined below. The results of a survey 
of construction industry practitioners show their positive attitude towards the JRM 
concept. The majority of listed risk items were suggested to be managed through JRM 
to some degree. Both “hard/technical” (e.g. technical capabilities, similar previous 
work experience, adequate resources, price, and quality of performance) and 
“soft/relational” factors (e.g. an approach to joint problem solving, attitude towards 
collaboration, creativity/innovation, attitude to continuous improvement etc.) play an 
important role in forming a project team for JRM. Among the factors which create a 
successful collaborative environment, mutual trust, open communication among the 
actors, understanding each other‟s objectives and equitable and clear allocation of 
foreseeable risks were identified as the most important. Early involvement of 
subcontractors and main suppliers is vital as their competence helps in effective risk 
identification and risk assessment. A project team involving clients, contractors and 
consultants should thus be formed before the final contract award. This helps in 
facilitating an effective project briefing that, in turn, leads to better understanding of 
the project‟s objectives by the actors. JRM was identified by practitioners as the best 
strategy for managing unforeseen risks and risks that change during the project 
implementation.  
Hartman et al. (1997) use the term “dynamic risk management” for the similar 
approach for proactive and joint management of risks. The study highlights the 
importance of project actors‟ beliefs in team efforts. Otherwise, it is impossible to 
achieve a win-win scenario. 
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JRM and current procurement procedures 
Empirical studies on RM practices in different countries (Akintoye and MacLeod 
1997, Lyons and Skitmore 2004, Osipova 2008, Simu 2006, Tang et al. 2007, Wood 
and Ellis 2003, Zou et al. 2008) show that RM is not carried out systematically in 
many projects. While open discussion of risks in the early phases as well as their 
collaborative management throughout the project are found to be important drivers of 
effective RM, the communication of risks between the actors does not work. Despite 
of the visible advantages of collaborative work it is often the case that each actor is 
focused on his own part of the project and management of associated risks. Traditional 
procurement procedures based on formal contracts are often seen as a main barrier to 
effective collaboration in construction projects (Kadefors 2004). Moreover, in 
traditional procurement there is more focus on price and short-term result than on 
collaboration and long-term relationships (Eriksson et al. 2008). 
To overcome the insufficiencies of traditional procurement procedures, the concept of 
relational contracting (RC) has been explored extensively in the research literature and 
in practice (Carson et al. 2006). RC is a concept that focuses on the relationship 
between the contract parties and recognises mutual benefits and win-win scenarios 
through cooperation in the project. RC supports such cooperative agreements as 
partnering and alliancing, and facilitates teamworking and JRM (Rahman 2003).  
Over the last decade, collaboration through partnering has been widely applied in 
many countries (Bayliss et al. 2004). Partnering is argued to be a means to overcome 
adversarial relationships and create collaborative project environment. Several studies 
show that industry practitioners are positive about collaborative relationships and 
believe they lead to cost and risk reduction (Akintoye and Main 2007, Black et al. 
2000). The results of the other study (Drexler and Larson 2000) show that 
relationships in partnering projects are much more stable than in other types of 
projects. As JRM requires collaborative effort of project participants, partnering can 
be considered as a procurement strategy that facilitates JRM: 
Hypothesis 1. Collaboration through partnering is positively related to the use of 
JRM. 
From the perspective of dealing with risks, early involvement of contractors and 
consultants in joint specificarion is considered to be advantageous. It allows utilisation 
of their competence and expertise from the very beginning that, in turn, leads to better 
understanding of project risk. Cooperative work of the architects and contractors is 
argued to result in better technical solutions and help in avoiding many design and 
technical risks. Moreover, significant savings are possible in the beginning of project, 
since changes in the early phase cost less money than in the production phase (Uher 
and Toakley 1999). Thus, the second hypothesis assumes that: 
Hypothesis 2. Joint technical specification by client, contractor and consultants is 
positively related to the use of JRM. 
Open bid invitation is widely used in the construction industry. It creates competition 
between contractors and puts more focus on price and short-term results (Eriksson and 
Laan 2007). On the contrary, limited bid invitation, i.e. direct negotiations with one or 
two contractors, is argued to facilitate long-term relationships and, in turn, better 
collaborative environment (Eriksson et al. 2008). Thus, hypothesis 3 states: 
Hypothesis 3. Limited bid invitation is positively related to the use of JRM. 
The focus on price when evaluating project bids is a common approach in the 
construction industry (De la Cruz et al. 2006, Eriksson and Laan 2007, Rahman and 
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Kumaraswamy 2008). At the same time the soft evaluation parameters are often 
neglected. There are a lot of examples of poor contractor selection that led to 
significant cost overruns for clients as contractors always try to find ways to decrease 
their own cost (Branconi and Loch 2004). In order to create a successful collaborative 
environment that supports JRM, these soft/relational parameters must be taken into 
account. Some examples of such parameters are contractor's resources and 
competence, previous experience with the contractor, size and financial stability, 
attitudes towards changes and continuous improvement, references, and collaborative 
ability (Eriksson 2008). Thus, the next hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 4. Consideration of soft parameters during bid evaluation process is 
positively related to the use of JRM. 
Today subcontractors carry out the largest part of construction work, which results in 
multiple points of responsibility as well as difficulties in risk communication 
(Loosemore and McCarthy 2008). In order to better control the whole supply chain, 
more attention should be paid to including subcontractors in the project team. The 
results of a survey conducted by Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2004) indicate positive 
attitudes towards bringing subcontractors and suppliers very early in the project, 
before the contract is awarded. This helps in facilitating an effective project briefing 
that, in turn, leads to better understanding of the project‟s objectives and JRM: 
Hypothesis 5. Joint procurement of subcontractors by client and main contractor is 
positively related to the use of JRM. 
The concept of RC highlights the importance of contract incentives in order to 
facilitate joint problem solving. Some payment mechanisms, for example, lump sum, 
shift all responsibility to one actor and do not underpin possibilities for performance 
improvement. A study by Muller and Turner (2005) indicates that lump sum contracts 
have adverse effects on communication between client and contractor. On the 
contrary, when incentives are used, rational decisions makers tend to put effort in 
minimising risk so they can get a reward (Knight et al. 2001). Moreover, they prefer 
to cooperate when tangible reward for problem solving is provided (Cheung et al. 
2008). Turner and Simister (2001) argue that projects based on cooperation and not 
conflict require incentivisation of all involved actors. A survey conducted by Bubshait 
(2003) shows that incentive contracts are an effective instrument for promoting 
project actors' performance, however, their use is still limited in practice. Thus, it is 
predicted that: 
Hypothesis 6. Cost-reimbursable payment mechanisms with incentives or bonuses are 
positively related to the use of JRM. 
Finally, a number of collaborative tools are available for creating and supporting 
effective project environments (Bayliss et al. 2004, Black et al. 2000, Eriksson and 
Nilsson 2008). Some examples of such tools are: establishment of joint objectives, 
relational workshops, joint project database, team building activities, joint project 
office and partnering facilitator. Usually, the use of collaborative tools is limited in 
construction projects (Eriksson 2008) despite the fact that they are necessary for joint 
activities in general and JRM in particular: 
Hypothesis 7. The use of collaborative tools in the project is positively related to the 
use of JRM. 
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RESEARCH APPROACH 
Questionnaire survey 
The main part of the study is a questionnaire survey of construction clients that are 
members of the Swedish Construction Clients Forum. The purpose of the survey was 
to analyse how different procurement related factors affect the project results. The 
questionnaire survey was developed consisting of three sections. The first section 
contained general questions about the respondent. The second section covered 
decision models during project procurement, e.g. payment mechanisms, choice of the 
main contractor, procurement of subcontractors, the use of collaborative tools etc. 
Finally, the third section discussed different aspects of the final project result. The 
questions were not focused on a particular project but on project performances in the 
clients‟ portfolios of procured and finished projects. Responses to the questions were 
rated on a seven-point Likert scale range: from 1 = very seldom/unimportant/very 
dissatisfied to 7 = very often/ important/satisfied.  
The participants represented various types of construction clients: regional, national 
and international industrial and property companies, municipal and regional 
authorities, and government services and agencies. At the first stage, a letter with 
information about the survey, its purpose and importance for the construction clients, 
was send by the CEO of the Forum to the 140 organisation members. Then, the 
registered contact person within each organisation was contacted by telephone and 
asked to provide the details of possible respondent. At this stage six organisations 
declined to participate due to lack of time. Finally 134 questionnaires were sent and 
111 responses were received after two reminders. From obtained responses five 
questionnaires were excluded due to the significant amount of missing values. From 
the population of 140 organisations, 106 usable questionnaires were received resulting 
in a response rate of 76%. 
Data analysis 
When the completed questionnaires had been collected by mail, the data was entered 
into the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). All questions were converted 
into variables and each answer alternative was coded using value labels. In order to 
test hypotheses, relationships between the dependent variable "use of JRM" and 
independent variables "procurement procedures" have been modelled using 
hierarchical regression analysis. 
RESULTS 
To fulfil the first purpose of this research - to measure the extent of JRM in the 
Swedish construction projects - the mean value was obtained. The results indicate a 
limited use of JRM, as the average score is 3.1 on the seven point scale. 
In order to test relationships between the use of JRM and procurement procedures two 
models were constructed. In Model 1, the following characteristics of the client are 
included: area of the client's activity, i.e. local/regional or national/international 
market; type of work mostly performed by client, i.e. new construction/rebuilding or 
maintenance work; and if the client follows public procurement regulation or not. 
Model 2 summarises both client's characteristics and cooperative procurement 
procedures: local/regional or national/international market, new 
construction/rebuilding or maintenance work, public procurement regulation, extent of 
partnering, joint technical specification, limited bid invitation, soft parameters during 
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bid evaluation, joint subcontractor selection, payment mechanism with 
incentives/bonus, and use of collaborative tools. The results of regression analysis 
show significant correlations between the dependent and independent variables (Table 
2). For Model 1, R square change is 0.105 and significant at the 0.01 level. For Model 
2, R square change is 0.385, i.e. almost 40% of variation in the use of JRM can be 
explained by the combination of the cooperative procurement procedures. 
Table 2: Regression analysis 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 0.324 0.105 0.078 1.71 0.105 3.981 3 102 0.010 
2 0.700 0.489 0.436 1.34 0.385 10.221 7 95 0.000 
 
Table 3 presents detailed analysis of the hypotheses. In Model 1, the variable "area of 
the client's activity", i.e. if the client is active on local/regional market or 
national/international market, is significant at the level 0.05. The correlations between 
the use of JRM and individual procurement procedures are non-significant at the 0.05 
level in six cases. This suggests that six hypotheses are rejected. The relationship 
between the use of JRM and use of collaborative tools is however positive and 
significant on the 0.01 level. Thus, Hypothesis 7 is confirmed: the higher the use of 
collaborative tools, the higher the use of JRM. 
Table 3: Coefficients 
Model 
  
  
  
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.538 0.820   1.877 0.063 
  Public procurement regulation 0.328 0.410 0.091 0.801 0.425 
  New construction/rebuilding or 
maintenance work -0.185 0.545 -0.032 -0.340 0.735 
  Local/regional or 
national/international market 
0.993 0.429 0.262 2.313 0.023 
2 (Constant) -1.046 1.093   -0.957 0.341 
  Public procurement regulation 0.327 0.494 0.090 0.662 0.510 
  New construction/rebuilding or 
maintenance work 
0.329 0.448 0.057 0.735 0.464 
  Local/regional or 
national/international market 
1.062 0.365 0.280 2.910 0.004 
 Partnering 0.179 0.126 0.179 1.416 0.160 
  Joint specification 0.103 0.092 0.126 1.118 0.266 
  Limited bid invitation -0.140 0.138 -0.150 -1.016 0.312 
  Soft evaluation parameters 0.015 0.136 0.010 0.110 0.913 
 Joint subcontractor selection 0.044 0.086 0.054 0.506 0.614 
  Incentive-based compensation -0.023 0.171 -0.017 -0.135 0.893 
  Collaborative tools 0.604 0.169 0.400 3.573 0.001 
 
As the regression analysis reveals, there is a significant correlation between the area of 
the client's activity and the use of JRM (R Square is 0.105). Hence, an additional 
analysis was conducted to further investigate this relationship. A compare means 
analysis (Table 4) shows that the clients working on national/international market use 
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JRM to a significantly larger extent (mean value = 3.9) than those who work 
locally/regionally (mean value = 2.7). 
Table 4: Comparison of means 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Local/regional market 72 2.7222 1.63778 0.19301 2.3374 3.1071 
National/international 
market 
34 3.9118 1.81522 0.31131 3.2784 4.5451 
Total 106 3.1038 1.77780 0.17267 2.7614 3.4462 
 
DISCUSSION 
During recent years, the Swedish construction industry has been trying to overcome 
the problems with increasing cost, project delays and quality problems. The actors 
have recognised the insufficiencies of traditional procurement and importance of 
relational contracting. However, the industry is still not efficient enough to expect 
rapid changes. There are a number of obstacles to increased collaboration (Eriksson et 
al. 2008). Some examples are conservative culture, adversarial attitudes, short-term 
perspective, traditional organisation of construction process and traditional 
procurement procedures. Despite the fact that collaboration through partnering has 
been introduced in Sweden, the use of partnering is still scarce and the use of 
collaborative tools is limited (Eriksson and Laan 2007). This study supports previous 
findings and shows the limited use of JRM in Sweden. It is also in line with a study by 
Tang et al. (2007) where the absence of JRM mechanisms was identified as the most 
important barrier to effective RM. One reason for the limited use of collaborative tools 
and JRM can be the lack of competence among the project actors. To involve a 
partnering facilitator that guides joint activities of a project team can be one solution 
to increase collaboration and promote the use of JRM. 
The hierarchical regression analysis shows that the use of JRM is positively affected 
by the use of cooperative procurement procedures. Together, the use of partnering 
agreements, joint specification, cost reimbursable payment mechanism with 
incentives/bonus, limited bid invitation, soft parameters during bid evaluation, joint 
procurement of subcontractors, and collaborative tools increase the use of JRM. 
However, looking at the individual procedures, only the use of collaborative tools has 
a statistically significant positive effect on JRM. A strong correlation between the use 
of JRM and the use of collaborative tools is in line with previous research which 
indicate that collaborative project environment is a necessary condition for an 
effective JRM process (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008). 
Furthermore, the results show that clients working on a national/international level use 
JRM in a greater extent than those who are working on the local/regional markets. 
This can be explained by the fact that larger national companies allocate more 
resources in development and improvement activities and have a broader competence 
when it comes to project management practices. 
The fact that six hypotheses were rejected indicates that further research on effects of 
other procurement procedures on the use of JRM is needed. In order to obtain more 
evidence, further investigation based on qualitative data (e.g. interviews with the 
project actors) will be conducted. The fact that the cooperative procurement 
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procedures together correlate significantly with the use of JRM gives an indication of 
their significance in practice. In this study, the use of JRM is discussed only from the 
client's perspective. Investigation into attitudes of contractors and consultants would 
contribute to the significance of the research. The study is a part of a research project, 
which aims at developing and testing a JRM model that can be used for guiding JRM 
activities at the different project stages in order to facilitate project success. In the 
future work two case studies will be performed with a main purpose to explore how 
JRM is working in practice. The literature review, questionnaire survey and case 
studies results will then form the basis for development of a JRM model. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Successful projects require stable relationships between the actors as well as 
collaborative environment for an effective management of project risks. The results of 
the study support previous research findings that the use of collaborative tools in 
general, and JRM in particular, is limited. Potential reasons for these limitations are 
discussed: traditional procurement procedures that are commonly used in the industry 
do not support collaboration. The other explanation can be that project actors 
experience a lack of competence in cooperative project management.  
The following cooperative procurement procedures that facilitate collaboration and 
JRM are identified: joint technical specification by client, contractor and consultant; 
cost-reimbursable payment mechanism with incentives/bonuses; limited bid invitation, 
consideration of soft parameters during bid evaluation process; joint procurement of 
subcontractors by the client and main contractor; and the use of collaborative tools 
such as establishment of joint objectives, relational workshops, joint project database, 
team building activities, joint project office and partnering facilitator. Together these 
procedures have a significant impact on JRM, whilst the use of collaborative tools is 
the most important factor. 
JRM is an important collaborative process aiming at safeguarding the project 
objectives and achieving a win-win scenario. The research results presented in this 
study are expected to increase awareness of construction clients about the importance 
of cooperative procurement procedures that support JRM. 
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